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The Fregean theory of syntax says what the meaningful parts of sen- 
tences are, and which combinations of those parts are meaningful. The 
Fregean theory of meaning says how the meaningful parts of a meaning- 
ful expression contribute to that expression's sense and reference. The 
theory of syntax discerns two basic kinds of meaningful parts of sentences: 
proper names and function-names. 1 Each function-name has a type deter- 
mined by the number of argument places it has and the type of expression 
appropriate to each argument place (BL, w 23). Every complex proper 
name is the result of completing a function name with expressions of the 
appropriate types (and conversely). 
The Fregean theory of meaning assigns objects to proper names as 
senses and references, and functions to function-names. While proper 
names and objects are 'complete' or 'saturated', function-names and func- 
tions are 'incomplete' or 'unsaturated'. 2 The reference of a complex ex- 
pression is the value of the function which is the reference of the expres- 
sion's main function-name when it takes as arguments the references of 
the expressions which fill the main function-name's argument places 
(BL, p. 34). Analogously, the sense of a complex expression is a function 
of the senses of its parts. 
Sentences, says Frege, stand for (have as references) truth values (BL, 
w 2). Truth functional sentential connectives stand for functions from 
truth values to truth values (BL, w167 , 12, 31). And quantifiers stand for 
functions from first-level functions of one argument to truth values (BL, 
w167 8, 31). But Frege overlooks the fact that quantifiers and connectives 
play a dual role which is ignored by his theories. 8 '&' is apparently truth 
functional when standing between sentences, but is not when contributing 
to the references of larger quantificational contexts such as 'Vx(Fx&Gx)': 
here there simply are no truth values to be taken as arguments, no sen- 
tences to fill argument places. Similarly, quantifiers are well described as 
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they attach to unary predicates, yet in 'Vx3y Rxy' Frege must be at a loss 
to explain the referential contributions of the existential quantifier since 
it is not followed by a first-level function-name of one argument place. 4 
What one is inclined to say on Frege's behalf here - indeed the only 
obvious thing that could be said for Frege - is that in these more complex 
cases connectives stand for functions from first-level functions to first- 
level functions, and, analogously, quantifiers stand for functions from 
first-level functions of  n arguments to first level functions of n -  1 argu- 
ments. But there are two important difficulties with this. 
The first and perhaps least serious problem is that for Frege functions 
have only objects for values (BL, w 31). It is easy to see why this is so. I f  
some functions had functions for values, then the filling of argument 
places of some function-names with appropriate expressions would pro- 
duce a function-name, not a proper name as required by the theory of 
syntax. And attempts to specify the values of such functions for specific 
arguments will bog down in troubles isomorphic to Frege's celebrated 
troubles over 'the concept horse'. For our equation will look something 
like: 
(1) F( f (~) )  =g(~). 
This, though, could not be a true sentence - indeed it is not even a proper 
name - since it contains gaps, is ' incomplete') These troubles, I think, 
can be solved by seeing identity here as a full-blooded variable binding 
second-level function. 6 Thus instead of( l )  our picture should be more like 
F ( f  (x)) = x g (x); 
and, given hints from Frege, this may be equated with 
Vx[F(f(x))=g(x)]. 
Still, of course, the theory of syntax must be revized so as not to require 
the 'completion' of every function-name to be a proper name. 
The second and graver difficulty is that if Frege is to maintain his dis- 
tinctions of level he will now require infinitely many replacements for a 
single connective or quantifier. Thus '&' will have different types as it 
takes function-names of different types. Since function-names of different 
numbers of argument places have different types, and since the number of 
argument places a function-name can have is in principle unlimited, '&' 
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will have to assume an infinite number  o f  types. '&'s type differs, for  in- 
stance, in each o f  the following: 'p&q' ,  'p&Fx', 'Fx&Gy' ,  ' F x & H y z ' ,  
'Hxy&Rzw' ,  . . . .  Since this is not  possible for  Frege - each expression for  
h im has a unique type - there must  be an  endless number  o f  surrogates 
for  '& ' .  This is a serious problem because Frege is now forced to  explain 
the structure o f  language by appeal to an infinite number  o f  semantic 
primitives. But it seems very doubtful  that  any h u m a n  could master  such 
a language, and thus doubtful  that  the theory provides an acceptable ex- 
planat ion o f  the structure o f  h u m a n  languages.7 The value o f  Frege 's  
theories as an  account  o f  natural  language thus seems thoroughly  dissi- 
pated. This is apparent ly a major  problem for  any theory o f  language 
which both  maintains some sort o f  hierarchy of  levels and construes con- 
nectives and quantifiers as categorematic, as contr ibuting to meaning and  
reference, that  is, by  virtue o f  meant  or denoted entities. I t  is consequently 
appears that  it is a major  virtue o f  Tarski 's  account  o f  t ru th  tha t  it does 
no t  attribute denoted entities to logical vocabulary.  
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